Unsurprisingly, the focus is not on what we can, or cannot, learn about the nature of hallucination by introspective means - as has been favored by philosophers. The scientific papers make up Part I and, overall, form a tightly knit set. (I turn to the standing conceptions below.) In short, it is a nice combination of introductory and substantive material, written for the newcomer as well as those already familiar with the topic. Especially notable is her introduction to the philosophical domain of two further conceptions of hallucination - the contingent disjunctive conception and the imagery/memory conception. She gives a tightly woven exposition of key terms, a summary of the historical and contemporary debates driven by the notion of hallucination, and the proposal of future directions to take - both philosophical and scientific - in investigating the nature of hallucination. As with all her introductions, it is ambitious, clear and extremely thorough - an excellent set up for the papers that follow. The volume is anchored by Macpherson's Introduction. Originally presented at the conference "Hallucination on Crete" (2008), the papers form an exciting, and much-needed, volume. Fiona Macpherson and Dimitris Platchias' volume contains sixteen previously unpublished papers on hallucination - five in psychology and neuroscience, and eleven in philosophy. From arguments for indirect realism, to representational views of experience, to recent discussions of direct realism and disjunctivism, hallucination has shaped our theorizing about, and understanding of, the nature of perceptual experience.
The notion of hallucination has played a pivotal role in the philosophy of perception.
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